Planning Through the Private Sphere and the Transformation of Reform in Early Twentieth Century America by Geoffrey Guy
1 
 
Planning Through the Private Sphere and the  
Transformation of Reform in Early Twentieth Century America 
 
By Geoffrey Guy  
 
Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology 
University of Chicago, Illinois 
 
gaguy@midway.uchicago.edu  
 
© 2010 by Geoffrey Guy  
 
 
The Rockefeller Foundation (RF) determined in the early 1920s that development of a 
program in housing reform was an appropriate field of activity, yet over the next two decades, it 
would repeatedly lament its failure to develop such a program.
1
  The RF‟s home city of New 
York occupied the national vanguard in housing reform, containing a dense network of 
organizations with a tradition of reform dating at least to the 1850s.  While not always directly 
participating in groups such as the Association to Improve the Condition of the Poor, the 
Committee on the Congestion of Population, the Bureau of Municipal Research, the National 
Housing Association, committees on zoning, and others, RF officials remained part of the social 
world defined by organizations such as these.  So it is probably natural that they wished to 
participate in this collective project, as an emblem of belonging to the reform community. 
 Existing research has extensively documented the content of the programs of these 
reform organizations, and exhaustively questioned the extent to which it reflected the material or 
ideological interests of a ruling class, the working class, or a more universal public.
2
  
Strategically, these programs spanned a wide ideological spectrum, ranging from affirmations of 
classical liberal individualism, market relations, and benevolent charity, to calls for public 
distribution of resources for housing, to every conceivable public-private blend.  At the level of 
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content, programs varied as to scale of redistribution, what goods should be redistributed 
(property, money, etc.), and how redistribution should be undertaken.  But while established 
reformers fought over different programs, the practice of reform underwent a shift inexplicable 
solely in terms of the rise and fall of particular programs.  While once populated primarily by 
voluntary organizations created by morally-motivated individuals with significant ties to many 
domains of reform, by midcentury specialized and paid professionals populated autonomous and 
differentiated policy fields. 
 At the same time, the advent of modern philanthropic foundations placed vast economic 
resources potentially at the disposal of the reform community.  On the one hand, this made it 
possible simply to pursue established types of morally-oriented reform projects on a much-
expanded scale.  Most notably, the Russell Sage Foundation underwrote the National Housing 
Association‟s campaign for improved housing codes, while many individual philanthropists such 
as John D. Rockefeller Jr. (JDR Jr.) used these resources to build model housing projects 
throughout American cities in an attempt to stimulate the benevolent spirits of other economic 
elites.  On the other hand, another contingent of actors would, without always being fully 
conscious of this fact, mobilize these economic resources to redefine the terrain upon which 
reform was undertaken, emphasizing the positive role of institutions such as universities and 
professional groups in discovering and diffusing innovative techniques, and in investing private 
business with ethical content.  These reformers increasingly displayed their authority through the 
mantle of reason and expertise rather than through a universalizing morality accessible to all, 
resulting in a shift in the center of gravity of reform discourses from a broadly inclusive public 
sphere defined by its moral assumptions to spaces defined foremost by access to intellectual 
resource embodied in universities and professions.   
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 On the face of it, this looks like fairly standard rationalization, bureaucratization, 
modernization, etc.  These moral and rational types of reform cannot, however, be placed in a 
linear chronological series.  Through this period, the Sage Foundation worked with moral 
reformers to modernize their practices through development of social surveys and other research 
facilities, developing a specific type of methodology grounded in experience with social 
casework.
3
  Morally-oriented reformers would launch withering critiques of individual 
“innovative” projects, arguing that they failed to achieve their advertised system-wide effect; 
instead, improvements in housing and planning required improved bureaucratic facilities for 
collecting and presenting data to the public, which might enact positive but coercive legislative 
measures.
4
  Confident in the shared moral values and judgments of the community, these facts 
could speak for themselves and demand organized action to rationalize modern society according 
to moral goals. 
 Similarly, the “modernized” pole of this historical change did not monolithically and 
inexorably take the form of differentiated fields.  Materials at the Rockefeller Archive Center 
(RAC) document at least two modalities in which this type of rationalization might have taken 
place, represented by a proposed Research Institute of Economic Housing and the City Housing 
Corporation.  Although these materials cannot illuminate the entire scope of this change in the 
practice of reform – lacking in particular detailed reflections on their moralistic colleagues and 
private industry – they do reveal the concerns and aspirations of central agents of this change, as 
well as the logics whereby this marriage of economic and intellectual resources was 
accomplished.  Attempts by agents on all sides to portray their programs as technically neutral 
notwithstanding, these documents reveal awareness that “innovations” at a programmatic level 
also signaled affiliations with particular groups trying to create and structure autonomous fields 
4 
 
according to particular social agendas and types of resources.  Although the RF felt its family of 
philanthropies had failed to ever articulate a program in housing reform – in other words, a 
unified series of cumulative programmatic innovations – their periodic activities managed, 
without any conscious agenda at the outset, to contribute materially to this social project of 
transforming the reform field along specific trajectories.  Moreover, this provided crucial 
groundwork for establishing the capacity of federal agencies to operate in the housing field 
during the 1930s – a feat likely unattainable by moral reformers directly advocating state action. 
 
The Holden Report 
The Rockefeller philanthropies were concerned about innovation not just in terms of new 
programs, but at least equally about the form of social relationships presupposed by different 
programs.  In at least one case, this normative concern about formal social relationships trumped 
sympathy with the content of a program.  Ultimately, the normative strictures they placed around 
the development of a program prevented them from developing a unified series of programmatic 
innovations. 
 Nevertheless, the Rockefeller philanthropies early resolved that contributions to housing 
projects were within their policy, provided they were limited to research into management and 
construction, and to dissemination of findings.
5
  Although this resolution appears to have 
contemplated primarily pursuit of innovations in programmatic content, the RF‟s initial research 
subtly committed it to a much broader-based social agenda.  The initial resolution authorizing the 
research program in housing also resulted in formation of a Housing Committee chaired by 
Beardsley Ruml of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM).  Its activities were 
bookended by two reports on the state of the field of housing research – the first completed in 
1924 by Arthur C. Holden and Associates, an architectural firm with a proprietor active in 
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housing reform and the emerging field of city planning, and the second in 1931 by Ernest M. 
Fisher, an economist previously affiliated with the Institute for Research in Land Economics 
(also funded in part by LSRM), Director of Research and Education for the National Association 
of Real Estate Boards, and later Economic Advisor for the Federal Housing Association.  Both of 
these argued vigorously for the need to take an objective view of the whole field of housing 
construction and provision, and not just its separate aspects, a position with which those at the 
Rockefeller philanthropies would agree.
6
 
 The 1924 Holden report summarized research into the sources of the housing shortage 
which had afflicted the nation following the First World War – labor costs, materials shortage, 
capital costs, etc. – and the proposed means of addressing each.  The office memo on this report 
noted the general inadequacy of statistical data on housing in the New York area, but affirmed 
(against findings by the New York Real Estate Board and the mayor‟s office) that the shortage 
was very real.  More importantly, the report took the additional step of arguing that the shortage 
did not result from exceptional disruptions brought on by wartime, and thereby denied that the 
housing market would return to “normalcy” via its own natural operations.  With this, the 
Committee aligned itself with findings of the 1920 New York State Reconstruction Commission 
on the Housing Situation in which New York was experiencing a “permanent housing crisis”, 
and implicitly set itself against established interests in the real estate and building industries.
7
  
Without explaining the precise source of this permanency, this implied that modern conditions 
were qualitatively different from the 19
th
 century, and therefore reform could not rely on 
traditional market and charity mechanisms. 
 The implication was that the desire to move beyond short-term solutions and address the 
“permanent housing crisis” necessitated fundamental reorganization of the building and real 
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estate industries.  The memo championed industrial restructuring on mass-production lines, 
alongside substantial rethinking of basic relations of property-holding and land tenure, and a 
replacement of market-oriented mechanisms by large-scale organization in the building industry.  
Each of the existing policy solutions reviewed addressed only one aspect of the housing crisis – 
technical, pecuniary, legal, or economic – while leaving fundamental issues unresolved.   Taking 
inspiration from leaders in the new corporate economy, the memo would sum up, “It would seem 
that many of the aspects of the housing problem rose from this lack of organized effort necessary 
for building houses and that in the long run efforts to solve the housing problem would be 
successful only in so far as they addressed themselves, not to the symptoms of this 
disorganization as is so frequently the case, but to the provision of some means whereby the 
labor and materials of all kinds can be brought to a focus upon building construction as part of an 
integrated plan.  In other words it may be necessary to consider the development of some such 
integration of sources of raw materials, of building material factories and construction 
management and labor as is found in the Ford Motor Company or the United States Steel 
Corporation.”8 Thus “objectivity” and a holistic perspective were wedded to an organized 
surpassing of 19
th
 century individualism, as well as to emerging mass production technologies. 
 This went well beyond the traditions of 19
th
 century reform. Reorganization of an 
industry could not be accomplished by restrictive state legislation, nor through the voluntary 
charitable action of wealthy individuals.  The market could not be trusted to correct itself, and 
morally-oriented action would fail to accomplish more than piecemeal reforms.  Without calling 
attention to the fact, this also stood in tension with projects undertaken by JDR Jr. personally, 
such as his investments in a series of “garden apartments” developed by Andrew J. Thomas and 
Charles Heydt in the New York and New Jersey area.
9
  These continued the moral traditions of 
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19
th
 century limited-dividend “investment philanthropy” and model housing embodied by groups 
such as the City and Suburban Homes Company
10
, aimed at demonstrating that low-cost but 
good-quality housing could be produced at a moderate profit, and at inspiring other civic-minded 
wealthy individuals to follow the example.  By the terms being staked out in the mid-1920s, 
these practices were suited to an era gone by, defined by individual moralism. 
 Hence, the Rockefeller philanthropies looked for new ways of solving problems of 
housing and planning, less bound to traditional forms of philanthropy.  These relied more on 
improving knowledge and technology, professionalizing the fields most directly charged with 
urban development and construction, and cultivating an “objective” standpoint distinguishable 
from charitable voluntarism.  This strategy embodied a particular understanding of the necessary 
conditions for social change, and who could be relied upon as partners in reform.  Two projects – 
one completed and one abandoned – embodied this agenda.  The more successful of the two 
culminated in a three-way partnership between the LSRM, the City Housing Corporation (CHC), 
and the Institute for Research in Land Economics (IRLE), who built and analyzed large 
developments at Sunnyside Gardens in Queens (1924-1926) and Radburn in New Jersey (1928-
1930).   The second came in and out of focus throughout the 1920s, and contemplated 
establishment of a research institute dedicated to the implementation of mass production and 
rationalization of production in housing.   Although only the first would attract substantial 
economic resources of the Rockefeller philanthropies, the Rockefeller philanthropies were at 
least initially in sympathy with both.  Both sought to develop innovations in the housing field 
based on “objective” lessons drawn from the corporate economy and mass production; however, 
their understandings of the proper social means of implementing these lessons differed 
substantially.  In evaluating these two projects, the Rockefeller philanthropies leaned heavily on 
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fundamentally normative criteria regarding the proper relationships of technology, experts, and 
society – criteria which, although never fully articulated, would guide their attempts to reshape 
the terrain of reform and governance for the next two decades. 
 
A Research Institute of Economic Housing  
The first opportunity to implement a large-scale program of this nature presented itself in 
the architect Grosvenor Atterbury‟s proposal to found a Research Institute of Economic Housing.  
Atterbury was already well known for his experimentation with different kinds of materials and 
prefabricated housing parts starting in 1907 at the Phipps Model Tenements, and continuing 
through his work with the Russell Sage Foundation at Forest Hills Gardens.  Atterbury first 
proposed sponsorship of the Research Institute in 1921 to James Angell at the Carnegie 
Corporation, although the idea was percolating while he was still at work at Forest Hills 
Gardens.  Although Angell expressed interest in this project, and despite support from figures 
such as Herbert Hoover and Gifford Pinchot, Carnegie interest in this proposal would stall after 
Angell left for Yale later that same year.
11
  This proposal came to the attention of the Rockefeller 
Foundation five years later, following Atterbury‟s recommendation of a $4.5 million endowment 
for an Institute to the New York State Housing Commission, and favorable coverage of this 
recommendation in the New York Times.
12
  
 These housing experiments aimed to demonstrate the possibility of building aesthetically 
appealing homes at prices affordable by lower and middle income families without relying on 
permanent subsidy from either government or philanthropy.
13
  In Atterbury‟s understanding, this 
meant directly transposing production processes from the automobile or textile industries to 
home construction.  This would drive down costs of construction through economies of scale and 
tighter control of production: essentially, reorganizing the housing industry under criteria 
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familiar from engineering.  First, construction of a larger number of units would allow wider 
distribution of costs of professional design, making these professional services more affordable.  
Second, utilization of modern materials (e.g. concrete), standardization, and factory 
prefabrication of modularized housing parts would eliminate waste in production relative to 
antiquated methods of custom-built wood construction.  Factory production would lower labor 
costs by allowing employment year-round and regardless of weather, smoothing out sudden 
spikes and troughs in demand.  This lowering of production costs would lower the price of 
houses, while preserving market relations and the profit motive.
14
 The field of housing reform 
could make its greatest strides by taking advantage of the intellectual resources embodied in 
technology, and orienting action in the field toward technical advance. 
 On the face of it, this seemed to suit the criteria spelled out in the reaction to the Holden 
report.  It contemplated reorganization of the whole industry, adapted lessons of mass 
production, and relied on concrete research.  However, the Rockefeller Foundation would voice 
two main criticisms of the proposed Institute, which together point to a more specific 
understanding of the prerequisites of viable reform.  First, RF officials would reassert a central 
argument of the 1924 Holden Report: what was needed was not a program which treated 
“symptoms” of the problem, but something which addressed root causes.  To Atterbury, they 
responded that they felt that solutions to the housing problem were already too fragmentary and 
unconnected, and that the emphasis on construction responded to only one side of a more general 
problem.  The problem had to be treated as a whole, in all its aspects.  In this context, they 
expressed skepticism of Atterbury‟s claim that “[the constructional objective] appears to 
offer…an opportunity far transcending all other aspects of the problem.”15 How could it be 
shown that this outstripped the importance of taxation, interest rates, planning, land use, and 
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legal, sociological, and economic factors?
16
 Although expressing sympathy with and interest in 
the project, the RF would remain concerned about the difficulty of ascertaining what constituted 
a “useful contribution,” and what simply dealt with a single aspect of the problem.17   
 But why was it so important to implement a “unified” program and what exactly did that 
mean?  The RF had become expressly concerned in 1931 that it had not developed such a unified 
program in housing, despite the fact that the new head of the Social Sciences Division, Edmund 
Day, had wished to make housing a central concern of the division.
18
  Responding to a report by 
Ernest Fisher commissioned to help develop such a program, a staff member identified by the 
initials TBA (Thomas B. Appleget) would argue that technical innovations and model projects 
paled in importance relative to the overweening importance of the “sociological, political, and 
economic factors involved in the problem.”  He continued, “The general effect of Mr. Fisher‟s 
report is to convince one of the importance and difficulty of the housing problem and to 
discourage one from any approach towards this solution which would not include an attack on 
the whole front…The trouble with the work so far done is that it has been dominated by special 
interests and has attacked parts and frequently peripheral parts of the task.”19  In other words, a 
simple technological fix was insufficient, without simultaneously pursuing fundamental changes 
in the basic institutions structuring the provision of housing.  Technology could improve, but of 
what value would this be if development were still constrained by the gridiron street plan?  
Would houses be built one lot at a time?  How would communities develop in such a space?  
What safeguards would exist to prevent potential homeowners from overextending themselves 
financially?  Without treating all these areas simultaneously and in a unified way, any amount of 
technological advance would have limited effect.  Therefore, if the RF could not act on this 
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“whole front,” if it could not contribute to fundamental change, then it was unlikely it could 
achieve a durable contribution.  
 Unfortunately, the means of acting “on the whole front” were somewhat obscure; this 
comprised the second criticism of Atterbury‟s proposal.  Atterbury had extrapolated from one 
aspect of mass production, and he imagined this resulting in massive cost savings when 
implemented system-wide.  Continuing this line of thought, he imagined that continued 
experiments in a specialized setting would result in a linear accumulation of technological 
knowledge and innovations resulting in directly proportional decreases in construction costs.  
Insofar as this knowledge was conceived as purely technical, Atterbury could propose instituting 
a division of labor between the intellectual labor of technological development and the manual 
labor of construction and contracting.  This would result in an organizational separation between 
conception and execution, a radical deskilling of the construction industry, and a hegemony of 
experts possessing a monopoly of legitimate knowledge. Atterbury justified this hegemony by a 
rhetorical placement of the traditional trades as backwards, and modularized mass production as 
modern.  By the time of his final proposal to the RF, this separation would expand into a call for 
a completely new industry dedicated to producing standardized parts of housing, completely 
circumventing the traditional trades, and steered by the technological prowess of experts. 
But the RF was hesitant to sponsor a research project conceived and executed outside of 
the community it was directed toward.  If the industry were interested in such technological 
advances, it could and should pursue these of its own initiative, in a manner similar to how the 
chemical and electrical industries were pursuing their own modernization through establishment 
of technical institutes.
20
  In the meantime, the constellation of established interests clustered 
around the continuation of existing technologies was sure to mount resistance to any innovation 
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threatening to unsettle their position.
21
  Of what value was an innovation in concrete if the 
industry was tied to wood through established production skills and distribution networks?  The 
RF could not impose research and innovations on an industry and, perhaps unfortunately, the 
industry did not seem particularly interested.
22
  The RF, it would be explained to Atterbury, was 
not in the practice of initiating change.
23
  Without the proper social program, an innovation 
within a field might just as likely appear as an unwanted intrusion. 
 Atterbury‟s embedding of “mass production” within a narrowly technical rhetoric 
obscured the fact that he was proposing to strip authority and control over the field of house 
construction away from traditional groups and give it to experts lodged in a centralized 
instituted.  This rhetoric figured the accumulation of technical knowledge as a politically and 
socially neutral process, while ignoring its complex interaction with established interests and 
identities.  By contrast, those around the RF feared the exclusionary implications of this 
particular means of marrying or combining political and intellectual resources – that it would be 
ill-received by the industry and ultimately self-defeating.  As seen in the response to the Holden 
report, RF officials actually sympathized with Atterbury‟s emphasis on technological advance 
via mass production.  However, technological superiority, or a well-crafted program, was not 
sufficient by itself.  By failing to act on the whole social front, Atterbury‟s industrial avant-
gardism would inadvertently allow for the continuation of “old” business practices, which could 
be expected to provide a source of continued resistance to his proposed innovations. 
 
The City Housing Corporation 
This provides some explanation of the difficulties experienced by the RF in developing a 
unified program.  On the one hand, it felt the need to act “on the whole front.”  On the other 
hand, it is unclear what kind of agency might have been able to act at this scale.  The RF rejected 
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a traditionally hegemonic type of program which would impose its interests or ideas externally 
on an industry, yet it felt that simply “contributing” in haphazard fashion to different program 
proposals would fail to amount to much. 
 Although not explicitly conceived as such, one cluster of projects undertaken in the 1920s 
with sponsorship from LSRM, JDR Jr., and others began carving out how to elaborate a program 
capable of navigating between these strictures – a program which would in some ways anticipate 
the turn to public administration by the RF and the Spelman Fund a decade later.  These projects 
were brought together by participation in a model suburban development at Sunnyside Gardens 
in Queens (starting in 1924) and at Radburn in New Jersey (starting in 1928).  Primary 
participants included the City Housing Corporation (CHC), a limited dividend corporation 
founded in 1924 for the express purpose of building these suburbs and with direct ties to the 
regional planning movement, and the Institute for Research in Land Economics (IRLE), founded 
in 1920 for the primary purpose of studying agricultural problems.  These projects are 
remembered primarily for technical and design advances associated with superblock 
development, regionalism, mass production, professional management, financing, and usage of 
the corporate form.
24
  Much like Atterbury, those at CHC proposed experimenting with different 
forms of mass production and technological innovation, even going so far as suggesting direct 
adoption of Atterbury‟s methods.25  Their understanding of mass production, however, 
emphasized savings resulting from developing multiple houses as part of an integrated 
community, complete with a social-economic plan (embodied in deed restrictions) to keep 
housing affordable – and not primarily from lowering the cost of individual houses through 
standardization of production processes.  However, its contributions in acting along “the whole 
front” are of at least equal importance. 
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 While framed as a “demonstration project”, much like the model housing experiments of 
the 19
th
 century, the CHC projects imagined a different mechanism for reforming the field of 
housing.  As Richard T. Ely, board member of CHC and director of IRLE would explain, “[T]he 
fundamental purpose of the City Housing Corporation is to establish standards and methods and 
to stimulate others – not merely those who have similar benevolent aims, but private builders 
working for a profit.”26 Whereas early model projects relied on the benevolent spirit of wealthy 
individuals, willing to limit their profits in the interest of affordable housing, the CHC projects 
proposed gradual improvement of practices within the industry itself through an accumulation of 
knowledge.  Notably, the project broke with standard model housing practice in declining to 
offer houses at the lowest possible price.  Instead, enhanced profits from lower-cost construction 
would finance further construction in new locations.
27
  The directors imagined CHC operating in 
cities across the nations, or providing a model for businessmen.
28
 
 At first glance, this would seem hopelessly naïve.  What incentive would private builders 
have to pay attention to this idealistic experiment, especially given its philanthropic character?  
But IRLE had begun by April of 1923 developing a series of textbooks for the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards for use in standardized real estate education courses, the 
successful completion of which was becoming prerequisite to obtaining a real estate license in an 
increasing number of states.  At the same time, a growing number of urban real estate dealers, 
the “community builders,” were expanding into the development of entire subdivisions.29  Ely 
would write to Alexander Bing, president of CHC, that “findings” from “experiments” at 
Sunnyside in construction, planning, financing, marketing, and management of a subdivision 
would be used in these textbooks, which by 1925 were used by at least fifty universities.
30
  These 
texts would remain standard until at least the 1960s.
31
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 This combination of an experimental project with a concerted effort to reform the ethics 
and identities of real estate practitioners undid the separation of conception and execution 
underlying the RF‟s criticism of the Atterbury proposal for a centralized institute. Instead of 
foisting a fully-formed program on practitioners with established methods and practices, CHC 
and IRLE could strategically ally themselves with like-minded factions within the industry, 
while simultaneously inculcating newer members of the profession with new practices.  Reform 
would come not from a top-down restructuring of the whole industry, but through establishing a 
new set of ethical and professional criteria for participation in the field of housing production 
and steering practitioners towards a changed understanding of their duties, identities, and 
interests. Similar to the organization of social science pursued at the Social Science Research 
Council (SSRC), best practices and legitimate knowledge would not be produced in an external 
setting, but out of the shared experiences of the practitioners who were themselves the bearers of 
this knowledge.  In short, any innovations developed by CHC already had its public built in.   
 Additionally, this move toward professionalization mobilized the police power of the 
states in a manner less coercive than the regulatory strategy supported by Lawrence Veiller and 
the reformers at the National Housing Association.  Instead of fashioning the law as the 
repository of knowledge about standards and practices, bodies of licensed professionals would 
decide upon which practices were permissible and which not.  Private sphere voluntarism would 
be maintained, but actors would only be allowed into the housing field after demonstrating their 
motivation by moral as well as pecuniary forces.  Presumably, these moralized market actors 
would not countenance the detestable practices of the past.  Reform would not depend on the 
coercive power of the state to achieve its goals, for actors within the field of housing production 
under this new regime would naturally produce better conditions. The pursuit of private interest 
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need not produce collectively pathological results, but rather in combination with professional 
content, could reform the entire field. 
 Unlike Atterbury‟s institute, these projects attracted substantial support from the 
Rockefellers.
32
  As CHC began building Sunnyside in the summer of 1925, JDR Jr. purchased 
$150,000 of stock in the company.  At the urging of his advisor Kenneth Chorley, he would 
consider in late 1926 raising his investment to a half million, provided two other stockholders 
would similarly raise their commitment.  JDR Jr. was willing to put considerable financial 
support behind the company, but simply wished to avoid taking undue responsibility for the 
project by becoming the largest single stockholder.  When the difficulty of finding others willing 
to invest at this level became apparent, JDR Jr. agreed in the spring of 1927 to retire his stock 
investment, instead investing half a million dollars in bonds issued by CHC secured by second 
mortgages issued by home purchasers.
33
  As CHC initiated its second development project at 
Radburn, New Jersey in late 1928, JDR Jr. committed up to $3.4 million in loans, provided 
matching funds could be raised by the Corporation, whether as stock or loans.
34
 
 Apart from JDR Jr.‟s direct financial investment, LSRM staff also participated directly in 
the formation of the program of CHC.  The Housing Committee chaired by Beardsley Ruml met 
in early 1923 with Alexander Bing, the eventual President of the CHC, before commissioning the 
report from Holden.  While JDR Jr. privately pursued a series of model garden apartments in 
collaboration with the architect Andrew Thomas, the LSRM cultivated a proposal to develop a 
full model garden suburb community.  At the instigation of this Committee, Bing, along with 
architects Clarence Stein and Henry Wright, would draft a “Preliminary Study Regarding Garden 
Suburb Development with the limits of the City of New York,” detailing the possibilities for 
building such a suburb within the New York region.  The initial site chosen was deemed by Bing 
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too small for a full garden city – it could not support employment for all the projected residents – 
but pointedly planned for residential, park, commercial, and some industrial space.  This initial 
proposal emphasized suppression of speculative activity through various restrictive devices and 
cooperative ownership patterns, in an attempt to ensure that any increases in land value resulting 
from development would benefit the community, and not individual profit-seekers. 
 This support notwithstanding, RF officials would still express some uneasiness about the 
division of responsibilities between private industry and foundations.  Although generally 
impressed with the operations of CHC and convinced of the importance of its raising of 
standards, some felt that private industry should undertake actual construction, with CHC in 
charge mainly of shifting population.
35
 These objections, however, did not address the overall 
strategy of structuring reform and the field of housing, but only the distribution of 
responsibilities within it. In contrast to Atterbury‟s attempt to restructure the field of reform 
based on the basis of an abstracted accumulation of technical knowledge, the CHC-IRLE 
program cultivated organic ties to the industry itself.  Simply using the economic resources of the 
RF to develop intellectual resources was sufficient; a means of mediating the intellectual and 
industrial worlds had to be developed as well.  By placing reformers and practitioners in 
cooperative relationships, the educational and professionalizing program of IRLE would ensure 
the acceptability of programmatic innovations by the industry. 
 
Conclusion 
Sadly, no amount of support or profession-building was able to protect the CHC projects 
from the onset of the Great Depression.  Construction at Radburn would stall while only half 
finished.  And although residents were initially surprisingly able to continue making payments 
on houses built by CHC, by the mid-1930s, increasing numbers of houses had fallen into 
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foreclosure.  Residents at Sunnyside had organized to force renegotiation of debt.  Many 
challenged the CHC‟s practice of selling above cost and using excess profits to fund new 
projects, drawing on old morally based notions that philanthropic reform efforts should prioritize 
lowest prices above all else.
36
 
 Nevertheless, despite this ostensible failure, the CHC projects would continue to figure as 
important innovations as planners and reformers thought about the development of their 
profession, especially among those committed to a progressive understanding of planning.
37
  In 
part, this might be attributed to the work of profession-building undertaken by this network.  
Future entrants to the fields of urban and housing development and reform were increasingly 
socialized to the values represented in the CHC projects.  Its assumptions, even if not enacted, 
had been internalized into the community at least as an ideal for professional practice. 
 The Rockefeller philanthropies, primarily through the Spelman Fund of New York 
(SFNY), continued and consolidated this development of a social network in the 1930s, affecting 
a similar marriage of economic and intellectual resources through the medium of professional 
communication.  Its support of the National Association of Housing Officials (NAHO), a 
member of the “1313” organizations housed at the University of Chicago under the aegis of the 
Public Administration Clearing House, emphasized development of publications, conferences, 
and other mechanisms for the sharing of experiences among experts in housing and reform from 
different cities.  Most importantly, it developed a field service, funded by SFNY, to visit cities in 
the process of founding housing councils under the Federal Housing Act.  This field service 
facilitated a two-way exchange of information, gathering information about local conditions and 
practices while simultaneously educating newly-minted local officials about the best accepted 
professional practices.
38
  In 1934, its first year of operation, it visited eight cities.
39
  In its next 
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year, it expanded its reach to thirty-five cities,
40
 and by 1939 the chief of the Field Service made 
183 local visits.
41
 This field service developed most fully under the directorship of Coleman 
Woodbury, himself an alumnus of IRLE‟s graduate program.  While not a direct continuation of 
IRLE‟s collaboration with real estate agents, the philosophical and personnel continuity suggests 
considerable overlap.  Woodbury himself saw the development of this work as important enough 
to decline an offer to head President Roosevelt‟s commission on housing,42 claiming that work 
with NAHO promised to have greater effect.  Two Rockefeller philanthropies concurred in the 
importance of this program, with the RF funding it in 1934 and 1935, and the SFNY funding it at 
least until 1940, at a rate of approximately $10,000 per year.
43
 
 In addition to providing a mechanism for cultivating professional practice, the NAHO 
additionally helped explain the significance of new federal laws to local committees.  In this 
task, Woodbury felt that the NAHO likely profited from the placement of personal friends of his 
from the IRLE-CHC network, primarily Frederick Babcock and Ernest M. Fisher, at different 
points in the policy-making process at the Federal Housing Administration.
44
  Correctly or not, 
Woodbury credited the work of the Field Service with securing substantial local support for (or 
at least stifling local resistance to), the expansion of federal policies in housing.
45
  The field 
service accomplished this task, according to Woodbury, by “widening the horizons” of local 
officials, and slowly exposing them to the perspective of new laws by helping them develop the 
technical capacity, and the local intellectual resources necessary to conform to the law.  In a 
perhaps unconscious reflection of the CHC-IRLE strategy, NAHO facilitated the spread of a 
technically innovative program not through an external imposition of a fully-formed program, 
but through gradual re-education of established interests to the technical requirements of the new 
structures of housing and reform.  In Woodbury‟s terms, their personal consultations encouraged 
20 
 
local councils to keep “on the job of learning the scope and possibilities of their agencies when 
otherwise they probably would have thrown up their hands in disgust.”46 Members of the newly-
formed councils came from all sorts of backgrounds, and they might have then been expected to 
conduct surveys and economic analyses, and to acquire a facility with tax and property law.  
Participation in the new housing field being developed at the federal level demanded possession 
of these types of skills, this type of intellectual resource.  By working with local councils, NAHO 
permitted individuals to gradually acquire these skills, and gradually invest themselves in the 
rules of the emerging field. 
 The marriage of intellectual and economic resources accomplished by the SFNY and 
NAHO went one step further than that of the arrangement between IRLE, CHC, and LSRM.  The 
SFNY-NAHO arrangement spawned yet another marriage, giving substantial political capital to 
the growing federal housing bureaucracy by creating a social environment ready to accept its 
decisions and requirements.  With this move, the fields of housing and reform were durably 
transformed from a moral to a technical-professional order. 
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